

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN

NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD


34

NFIB-D-22.1/56
21 December 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Key Intelligence Questions
for Fiscal Year 1977

Attached is the final version of the Director of Central Intelligence's Key Intelligence Questions for Fiscal Year 1977. Copies are also being provided to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the National Security Council Staff.



25X1

WALTER ELDER
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
A/S

~~SECRET~~
NOFORN

Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

Secret
NOFORN

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Key Intelligence Questions
For
Fiscal Year 1977

*Published by the Intelligence Community Staff
for the Director of Central Intelligence
with the Advice of the
National Foreign Intelligence Board*

Secret

NFIB D 22.1/56
October 1976

Copy **Nº 134**

Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
NFIBONLY-	NFIB Departments Only
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Infor- mation Controlled by Originator
REL . . . -	This Information has been Authorized for Release to . . .

25X1



SECRET
NOFORN

Director Of Central Intelligence
KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS
FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1977

Published by the
Intelligence Community Staff
for the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice of the National Foreign Intelligence Board

SECRET
NOFORN

Director of Central Intelligence
KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS
FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1977

INTRODUCTION

The Key Intelligence Questions for Fiscal Year 1977, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence pursuant to his responsibilities under Executive Order 11905, represent a departure from past practice dictated by experience. The new list is short and highly selective, the questions having been chosen not only because of their importance to national consumers, but also because a real need for action by the Intelligence Community exists. The KIQs represent the DCI's guidance to all Intelligence Community collection and production managers on these selected subjects.

The Key Intelligence Questions continue to be formulated by the National Intelligence Officers. The primary purpose of the KIQs is to improve intelligence production and collection by providing a highly selective list of current, critical questions for a period of special operational attention. The purposeful limitation on the number of questions and their high degree of focus required that difficult choices be made from the many current high priority areas and questions. This required that certain issues or problems, although very important, be excluded. Also excluded were key problems of a critical nature which currently receive substantial and ongoing attention and which were not considered to require or lend themselves to Community action beyond that already underway. Examples are SAL and verification, the situation in the Middle East, as well as individual current weapon

SECRET

systems. Thus, the KIQs are a managerial device for focusing attention and increased effort on a small number of issues without altering the broader set of intelligence priorities.

The National Intelligence Officers, in collaboration with representatives of the NFIB agencies and with the advice of the Intelligence Community Staff and others as appropriate, will produce KIQ strategy reports aimed at developing special collection and analytical strategies to enhance the information gain and improve the analyses in each KIQ area of concern.

The performance of the Intelligence Community on the KIQs will initially be evaluated by the appropriate NIO to assess the effectiveness of the actions taken. Further evaluations will be undertaken as part of a regular Intelligence Community Staff program which assesses the timeliness and quality of the intelligence products in terms of the requirements of major users.

The KIQs and their performance evaluations cannot provide systematic inputs for resource allocation decisions by program managers due to their limited number, specificity, and emphasis on current operations. However, they can provide valuable insights for programming and planning. It is important to note that the KIQs do not derive their priorities from those appearing at the attachment to DCID 1/2, *US Foreign Intelligence Priorities for Fiscal Years 1977-1981*. Broad national intelligence planning priorities are based on a perspective of the foreign environment for the planning period and not on current operational needs.

Additions, deletions, or modifications to the Key Intelligence Questions may be issued from time to time during FY 1977, depending on major changes in the international situation or if the foreign intelligence environment should dictate. The order in which the FY 1977 questions are listed should not be regarded as implying an internal priority: by definition all the Key Intelligence Questions are of major importance, and are singled out for special operational attention.

SECRET

THE KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS

1. *Limited Uses of Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces:* What are Soviet policies and plans for the limited employment of nuclear forces or for responding to limited nuclear employment by the US? What are their capabilities for such employment in terms of command and control, availability, characteristics, and allocation of these forces?

2. *Soviet Civil Defense:* What are the plans, progress, potential effectiveness and implications of Soviet civil defense preparations to protect the leadership, economy and population from the effects of nuclear attack?

3. *Soviet ASW:* What progress are the Soviets making in acquiring an effective capability for detecting and tracking Western ballistic missile submarines at sea?

4. *Soviet Advanced Technology:* What progress are the Soviets making in advanced technologies crucial to the development of weapon systems which could have a significant influence on the USSR's strategic military posture?

5. *Nuclear Proliferation:* What are the objectives, programs, capabilities, incentives, and disincentives of candidate countries for developing or acquiring nuclear explosives or weapons? Include policies and actions of other countries which affect the capabilities or incentives of candidate states in acquiring a nuclear capability.

6. *Warsaw Pact Forces:* How does continuing Warsaw Pact force development affect the capability of these forces to conduct a war in Europe in either a conventional or nuclear environment?

25X1

SECRET

7. *Technology Transfer to the USSR*: How successful is the USSR in acquiring and absorbing foreign technology either through legitimate trade or through circumvention of export controls? What are the structural and efficiency differences between the military and civilian sectors and how do these affect the relative ability of each sector to absorb and diffuse Western technology within the USSR? What contribution does imported technology make to Soviet military and economic strength?

8. *China After Mao*: What are the internal power dynamics of the new leadership? How strong is Hua's position? Has the influence of the military been greatly strengthened by its role in Hua's elevation and the radical's downfall? What will be the foreign policies of the new regime, particularly toward the US and the USSR? How will it approach the issue of Taiwan-Mainland reunification? Will the new leaders depart significantly from Mao's domestic policy, and how will that affect internal stability?

9. *The West European Communist Parties*: What are the aims, tactics, and problems of the major West European Communist party leaders with respect to political power in their own states, relations with Moscow, and internal Communist party affairs?

10. *The Korean Military Balance*: What developments—domestic or international—are likely to affect seriously the military balance between North and South Korea or otherwise to increase the possibility of hostilities?

11. *Africa*: What are the policies and activities of the Southern African countries as they relate to the current emerging conflicts in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa? What are the strengths and weaknesses, the plans and the prospects, for dissident leaders and groups within each of the territories? What are the policies and actions of Ethiopia and Somalia with respect to a potential conflict in the Horn of Africa? What are the policies and level of involvement of the USSR, Cuba, and China with respect to Southern Africa and the Horn?


SECRET

12. *Cuba's Subversive Activities*: What are Cuba's plans and clandestine activities to interfere in the normal internal evolution of another nation by use of subversion or armed intervention; what evidence is there that Cuba is exerting influence or control over the governments of the Caribbean, especially in Jamaica and Guyana?

13. *Terrorism*: Which are the critical foreign terrorist groups now capable of attacking, threatening, or otherwise implementing actions inimical to the US or its interests? What are their relationships to each other, their mode of communication and travel throughout the world? What role do other governments and groups play in influencing and supporting terrorist groups? What are the plans of foreign terrorist organizations to seize, produce or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction?

14. *Issues in North-South Contention*: What are the strategies and tactics of the LDCs on the various issues being handled in the forums of the north-south debate such as the CIEC and UNCTAD? How serious is the problem? How strong are the divisive forces at work among the LDCs; e.g., between OPEC countries and the poor oil-importing countries? What LDC and Western initiatives are likely? How will they affect US interests? What influencing roles are the USSR and PRC playing?

25X6



Secret

NOFORN

Secret